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  1 
The International Criminal Court’s Chambers 
Practice Manual: Towards a Return to Judicial 
Law Making in International Criminal 
Procedure? 
 
Yvonne McDermott∗ 
Abstract 
 
This article discusses the nature of the International Criminal Court’s Chambers 
Practice Manual as an interpretative source, in the context of a wider debate on 
judges as procedural lawmakers in international criminal law. As is clear from the 
ICC Statute, the Practice Manual should not be seen as a source of law on a par with 
the Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence, nor even does it represent a 
secondary source of law. However, this article argues that the Practice Manual 
oversteps the mark of what could be expected from a guidance document containing 
merely non-binding recommendations in two important respects. First, as expressly 
acknowledged by the ICC’s President, the judges have perceived the amendment of 
the Practice Manual as an alternative to proposing amendments to the Court’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence to the Assembly of States Parties, a practice which has 
been fraught with difficulty in recent years. Second, the Practice Manual contains 
explicit instructions to Chambers, including text to be included in Chambers’ 
decisions, which appears to cross the boundaries of what should be expected from a 
guidance document. This article further argues that some early decisions of the Court 
following its adoption give the Practice Manual a normative force that ought not to 
attach to it. This raises issues of fairness, legal certainty, predictability and 
coherence, and overall, it is argued that the Practice Manual marks an unforeseen 
return to judicial law making in international criminal procedure. 
1. Introduction 
 
In May 2017, the International Criminal Court published the latest edition of its 
Chambers Practice Manual. 1  This was the Court’s second update to its Pre-Trial 
Practice Manual, which was first published in September 2015. 2  The Chambers 
Practice Manual is designed to reflect best practices as identified by the Judges of the                                                         
∗Associate Professor of Law, Swansea University, UK. Email: 
Yvonne.McDermottRees@swansea.ac.uk. 
1  ICC Chambers Practice Manual, May 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/170512-icc-
chambers-practice-manual_May_2017_ENG.pdf (‘Manual’).   
2  ICC Pre-Trial Practice Manual, September 2015, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Pre-
Trial_practice_manual_(September_2015).pdf. A first update was published in February 2016: ICC 
Chambers Practice Manual, February 2016, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Chambers_practice_manual--FEBRUARY_2016.pdf. 
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Court in relation to specific procedural issues, and to ensure consistency amongst 
differently constituted Chambers.3 The development of the Manual was a clear facet 
of the Court’s drive towards greater efficiency in its practices, given that the 
unwieldiness of procedures was one of the main criticisms levelled against the court 
in its first decade.4 
This article undertakes the first thorough analysis of the Chambers Practice 
Manual as a judicial source.5 In particular, it examines the impact and character of the 
Manual as a source of guidance to judges, and the extent to which Chambers are 
afforded the ability to deviate from the Manual. It situates this analysis within the 
context of a wider debate in international criminal law on the judicial development of 
international criminal procedure. Part 2 provides an overview of the history of judges 
as procedural lawmakers in international criminal law. It shows that, unlike its 
predecessors, the International Criminal Court’s legal framework significantly 
curtailed the ability of judges to act in the ‘quasi-legislative’6 role of drafting and 
amending procedural rules. However, as will be shown, recent difficulties have 
emerged with the ICC’s model of Rule amendments by States Parties to the Statute, 
and this, it is posited, will lead to a greater emphasis on less formal ways to enact 
procedural changes. The Chambers Practice Manual is therefore likely to grow in 
significance as a means through which judges can shape the ICC’s procedure. It is 
thus imperative that a systematic assessment of the normative force that attaches to 
                                                        
3 Pre-Trial Practice Manual (ibid.), Introduction (‘[I]t was considered vital to reflect on the at times 
inconsistent practice of the different Pre-Trial Chambers, and record what has been identified as best 
practice to be followed in pre-trial proceedings’).  
4  S. Zappalà, ‘Comparative Models and the Enduring Relevance of the Accusatorial-Inquisitorial 
Dichotomy’, in G. Sluiter et al. (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 44, 45; ICC Assembly of States Parties, Establishment of a Study Group on 
Governance, ICC-ASP/9/Res.2, 10 December 2010; S. Ford, ‘How Much Money does the ICC Need?’ 
in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 
2015), 84.   
5  Parts of the Manual are referred to in some literature, particularly K. Ambos, Treatise on 
International Criminal Law, Volume III: International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 
2016) at 114; 142; 344–365; 523-531; 661–662, as well as in X.-J. Keïta, ‘Disclosure of Evidence in 
the Law and Practice of the ICC’, 16 International Criminal Law Review (2016) 1048; F. Gaynor, K.I. 
Kappos and P. Hayden, ‘Current Developments at the International Criminal Court’, 14 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2016) 689, and P. Ambach, ‘The “Lessons Learnt” process at the 
International Criminal Court – a suitable vehicle for procedural improvements?’ 12/2016 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2016) 854, but the Manual as a whole, including its character and 
use by the Court, is not subjected to in-depth analysis in any of these works.  
6 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Report of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN Doc A/49/342 (29 August 1994), 
§ 27. 
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the Manual as a document to be used by parties before, and by Chambers of, the 
Court, be undertaken.  
Part 3 provides this assessment of the Chambers Practice Manual’s character 
as a judicial source, together with an analysis of its main content. It argues that the 
Manual appears to cross the boundaries of what should be expected from a guidance 
document in two important respects. First, as explicitly acknowledged by the ICC’s 
President, the judges have perceived the amendment of the Practice Manual as an 
alternative to the Court’s statutory framework on amendments to its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. Second, the Manual contains explicit instructions to 
Chambers, including text to be included in Chambers’ decisions, which appears to 
cross the boundaries of what should be expected from a guidance document. It also 
argues that the source of the ‘best practice’ that the Manual is supposed to reflect is 
often uncertain.  
Moreover, as shall be outlined in Part 4, some early decisions of the Court 
following the adoption of the Practice Manual appear to give the Manual a normative 
force that ought not to attach to it. Part 4 analyses the difference in opinion that has 
arisen between some Pre-Trial Chamber judges, who believe that their colleagues 
have shown undue deference to the Manual by treating it as though it were a source of 
law, and other judges, who have deemed it necessary to follow the Manual’s guidance 
closely. In the light of this important debate, this article examines what the return to 
judicial law making in international criminal procedure through the Chambers 
Practice Manual means for principles of fairness, legal certainty and consistency in 
international criminal law.  
 
2.  Judicial Law Making in International Criminal Procedure 
 
Procedural frameworks have been likened to railway tracks that are needed for the 
train of any legal process to run on.7 The judicial creation of rules of procedure is 
relatively common in international tribunals, including the International Court of 
Justice,8 various human rights courts,9 and the International Tribunal on the Law of                                                         
7 O.-G. Kwon, ‘Procedural Challenges Faced by International Criminal Tribunals and the Value of 
Codification’, in G. Sluiter et al. (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 1415.  
8 Art 30 Statute of the International Court of Justice (18 April 1946), 33 UNTS 993.  
9 Art 25(d) European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950), 213 UNTS 221; Art 60 
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the Sea.10 These Courts and Tribunals are mandated to create rules of procedure for 
carrying out their functions. In domestic criminal trials, by contrast, procedure is 
generally codified in advance, by statute or criminal procedure code passed by the 
legislature in the same manner as any other piece of legislation. 11  International 
criminal tribunals, being both international tribunals and criminal courts, are therefore 
left with a choice between conferring procedural rule-making power to judges, or 
depending on some external body to establish rules of procedure and evidence. 
Traditionally, the international tribunals’ preference has been to leave this role to the 
judges, with some important exceptions and nuances.  
There was some debate at Nuremberg over whether a ‘liberal rule-making 
power’12 should be left to the Tribunals, or whether detailed procedural rules should 
be outlined in advance.13 Ultimately, the Charters of both the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) at Tokyo stated that the Tribunals would draft (and, in the case of the 
IMTFE, amend14) their own rules of procedure, and that those procedural rules would 
not be inconsistent with the Tribunals’ Charters. 15  One might expect from this 
wording that the judges would constitute the ‘Tribunal’ for these purposes, but 
interestingly, it fell to the Chief Prosecutors to prepare a draft of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, which was later adopted by the President of each of the 
Tribunals.16 The Rules of Procedure of both Tribunals were scant by the standards of 
contemporary international criminal tribunals; the IMTFE Rules of Procedure 
                                                                                                                                                              
American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969), 1144 UNTS 143. 
10  Art 16 Statute of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, Annex VI, United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982), 1833 UNTS 3.  
11 E.g. Codice di Procedura Penale (Italy); Código de Processo Penal (Brazil); Code de procédure 
pénale (France). Some common law countries have traditionally eschewed a codified instrument on 
criminal procedure, but that is changing; England and Wales now has ‘Criminal Procedure Rules’, with 
the aim of ensuring ‘that criminal cases be dealt with justly’ (§ 1.1). National judiciaries do have a role 
in the formulation of legislative codes of procedure in many domestic systems. In the United States of 
America, for example, federal judges play a major part in the formulation of amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
12  ‘Report of Robert H Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials’, Department of State (1949), online at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf, 75. 
13 This was the preference of the Soviet delegation: ibid., 71.  
14  The power to amend the IMT Rules of Procedure was conferred via the Rules themselves, 
specifically Rule 11.  
15 Art 13 IMT Charter; Art. 7 IMTFE Charter.  
16 V. Tochilovsky, ‘The Nature and Evolution of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, in K. Khan et 
al (eds), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010), 157, 
159.  
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contained just nine Rules, whilst the IMT Rules of Procedure was comprised of just 
eleven. 
At the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), explicit statutory authority was granted to the judges of the 
Tribunal to adopt ‘rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial 
phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection 
of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters’. 17  The Security Council, 
having completed the Tribunal’s Statute, seemed content to confer responsibility on 
the judges of the Tribunal to enunciate a full procedural framework for the Tribunal’s 
operation.18 As the Appeals Chamber noted in Tadić, ‘the Statute is general in nature 
and the Security Council surely expected that it would be supplemented, where 
advisable, by the rules which the Judges were mandated to adopt, especially for Trials 
and Appeals’.19 
While the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone expressly mandated the judges to adopt the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of their predecessors, judges were also given the power to 
amend those Rules as they saw fit.20 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
grants judges the power to adopt and amend Rules of Procedure and Evidence, taking 
both Lebanese criminal procedure and other relevant international procedural 
standards into account.21 Even in those hybrid tribunals where the expectation is that 
domestic criminal procedure will apply, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, judges are permitted to adopt or amend Rules to ensure their 
compliance with international standards.22 
Although some authors believed that it would have been inappropriate for the 
Security Council, as a political body, to draft the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as 
well as the ad hoc Tribunals’ Statutes23 and others argued that granting procedural 
lawmaking powers to judges ensures greater coherence,24 this aspect of international                                                         
17 Art 15 ICTYSt.  
18 T. Meron, ‘Procedural Evolution in the ICTY’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) 
520, 521. 
19 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 2 October 1995, § 4.  
20 Art 14 ICTRSt.; Art 14 SCSLSt. 
21 Art 28 STLSt.  
22 Art 20 ECCC St. 
23 L.D. Johnson, ‘Ten Years Later: Reflections on the Drafting’, 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004) 368, 375-376.  
24 Zappala, supra note 4, at 51. 
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criminal law practice has not been without critique. At the time of the ICTY’s 
establishment, the NGO Helsinki Watch criticized ‘the Security Council’s near-
complete abdication of responsibility’ in this regard. 25  Sluiter argued that the 
formulation of Rules of Procedure and Evidence by the same judges who may well be 
asked to assess the validity and legality of those Rules at a later stage could raise 
issues of judicial impartiality and independence.26 Authors have noted the reactive 
nature of rule making in the ad hoc tribunals, where many Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence could be directly traced back to issues that arose in practice; this was 
particularly true for Rules on the admissibility of evidence.27 
In the drafting of the ICC Statute, considerable debate arose on the extent to 
which judges should be given the power to draft and amend procedural rules. 28 
Article 51 of the Statute greatly curtails the role of the judges in this regard, stating 
that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and any amendments thereto, must be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of States Parties to enter into force. 29  Rule 
amendments can be proposed by State Parties, by a majority of judges, or by the 
Prosecutor, 30 and these proposals are to be considered by the Assembly of States 
Parties (ASP).31 There is, however, an emergency provision, whereby a two-thirds 
majority of judges can agree upon provisional rules to be applied until the next 
session of the ASP.32 At that session, States Parties can decide whether to adopt that 
provisional rule into the permanent Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or whether to 
amend or reject it.33  
Despite the curtailing of the judges’ procedure-making role in favour of the 
ASP in the ICC’s legal framework, judges are not completely bereft of agency in this                                                         
25 Helsinki Watch, Procedural and Evidentiary Issues for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, August 
1993, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/YUGO938.PDF, 6. 
26 G. Sluiter, ‘Procedural Lawmaking at the International Criminal Tribunals’, in S. Darcy and J. 
Powderly (eds), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 
2010), 315, 325.  
27 Ibid.; G. Boas, ‘Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY and the 
Principle of Flexibility’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001) 41. The jurisprudential origins of Rules 92bis, 
ter, quater, and quinquies of the ICTY RPE are outlined in Y. McDermott, ‘The Admissibility and 
Weight of Written Witness Testimony in International Criminal Law’, 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2013) 971, 971-974. 
28 W.A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 643-644. 
29 Arts 51(1) & 51(3) ICCSt. 
30 Art 51(2) ICCSt.  
31 Art 51(3) ICCSt. 
32 Art 51(4) ICCSt. 
33 Ibid.  
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regard. Judges do, for example, have the power, pursuant to Article 52 of the ICC 
Statute, to adopt Regulations of the Court ‘necessary for its routine functioning’,34 
and the exercise of this power has not been without controversy.35 Nevertheless, the 
fact that the Regulations are limited in their scope to matters necessary for the routine 
functioning of the Court limits the ability of judges to use them as a proxy for 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Further, the ASP retains a 
supervisory role over the Regulations of the Court; once amendments to the 
Regulations are adopted, they are circulated to the States Parties and they only remain 
in force if there are no objections from a majority of States Parties within six months 
of their adoption. 36  In addition, the Trial Chamber has the power, under Article 
64(3)(a) of the Statute, to ‘confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are 
necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings’, a power 
that has been seen as granting a measure of influence in shaping ‘the overall 
architecture’ of proceedings. 37  The operation of this statutory function cannot, 
however, be likened to a procedural rule-making authority. One practical example of 
Article 64(3)(a) in use was the limiting of the trial in Banda and Jerbo to three 
specific contested issues as agreed by the prosecution and defence,38 but this is hardly 
equivalent to the establishment of a new procedural framework. Another example was 
the decision to appoint a single judge for the preparation of trial in Gbagbo; 39 
however, this procedure had already been established by Rule 132bis, which was 
adopted by the ASP in 2012.40 Further, ICC judges, acting by majority, can adopt 
provisional Rules, pursuant to Article 51(3), in urgent situations where there is a 
lacuna in the Rules; these provisional Rules are to be adopted until they are adopted, 
amended, or rejected by the ASP.  
                                                        
34 Art 52(1) ICCSt. 
35 Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the 
Charges against the Accused Persons (Katanga and Chui), ICC-01/04-01/07-3319, 21 November 2012. 
For an analysis, see S. Rigney, ‘“The Words Don't Fit You”: Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial 
Fairness, and Katanga’, 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2015) 1. 
36 Art 52(3) ICCSt. 
37  C. Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court: Anatomy of a Unique 
Compromise’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 603, 605-606. 
38 Decision on the Joint Submission regarding the contested issues and the agreed facts, Banda and 
Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-227), Trial Chamber IV, 28 September 2011; see further, G. Bitti, ‘Article 
64’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (3rd edn: Hart/Beck, 2016) 1588, 1598-1600.  
39  Decision designating a Single Judge pursuant to Rule 132 bis of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-700), Trial Chamber I, 23 October 2014. 
40 ASP, Amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/11/Res.2, 21 November 2012.  
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Thus, the framing and remoulding of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence remains very much centered on the ASP, which holds the ultimate power in 
this regard. By 2010, it became very clear that both the ASP and the Court were 
concerned with the efficiency of proceedings, 41  and that some procedural 
amendments might be needed to expedite processes. As a result, the ASP created the 
Study Group on Governance, a subsidiary body of the ASP comprised of 
representatives from State Parties, with the aim of enabling a ‘structured dialogue 
between States Parties and the Court’. 42  In 2012, following the issuance of the 
Lubanga judgment, the Bureau of the Study Group on Governance issued its ‘Lessons 
Learnt’ first report to the ASP, identifying nine ‘clusters’ of practice where procedure 
could be made more efficient.43 The ASP endorsed the ‘Roadmap’ proposed by the 
Study Group on Governance, which was designed to facilitate dialogue between the 
Court and the ASP to consider amendments to the Rules that would expedite trials 
before the Court.44 Under the Roadmap, a number of steps for amending Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence were established.45 First, the Working Group on Lessons 
Learned, comprised of judges of the Court, would examine whether potential 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence could be identified; any 
identified proposed amendments would be communicated to the Advisory Committee 
on Legal Texts for further consultation.46 The Advisory Committee, if in agreement 
with the Working Group, would submit those proposed Rule amendments to the 
Study Group on Governance. If the members of the Study Group on Governance 
agreed with the proposals put forward by the judges,47 it would in turn convey them 
to the ASP’s Working Group on Amendments, which would decide whether to invite 
the ASP to vote on adopting the proposed amendments at its next regular session.                                                          
41 For a detailed overview, see P. Ambach, ‘A Look towards the Future – The ICC and “Lessons 
Learnt”’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 1277, at 1285-1287. 
42 ASP, Establishment of a Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/9/Res.2, 10 December 2010. 
43 Study Group on Governance, Lessons Learnt: First Report of the Court to the Assembly of States 
Parties, ICC- ASP/11/31/Add.1, 23 October 2012 (“First Report”). 
44  Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-
ASP/11/Res.8, 21 November 2012, § 41. 
45 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/12/37, 15 October 2013, § 11. 
46 This Committee was established by Regulation 4 of the Regulations of the Court (ICC-BD/01-01-04, 
26 May 2004), and is comprised of three judges (one from each Division), and one representative each 
from the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry, and list of counsel. 
47  The Study Group may, in the interim, revert to the Working Group with views and 
recommendations, which will in turn report back before the Study Group transmits its 
recommendations on proposed Rule amendments to the Working Group on Amendments: supra note 
45, § 11. 
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In October 2013, the Working Group on Amendments recommended two 
proposed amendments that had come through the Roadmap process to the ASP,48 both 
of which were adopted by consensus in November 2013.49 The first concerned Rule 
100, on proceedings outside the seat of the Court. The amendment provides for a 
more expeditious process for sitting in a State other than The Netherlands, by 
allowing the Chamber to make a recommendation (acting by majority) to the 
President, taking into account the views of the parties, victims, and the Registry’s 
assessment. 50  The second recommended amendment was to Rule 68 (on prior 
recorded testimony), and the amendment incorporates almost wholesale Rules 92bis, 
ter, quater and quinquies of the ICTY RPE, thus allowing prior recorded testimony to 
be admitted to the evidential record where the witness was dead, had been subject to 
intimidation, or where the evidence did not go to the acts and conduct of the 
accused. 51  At the ASP, the Kenyan delegation raised concerns that this Rule 
amendment could infringe the rights of the accused. In order to address these 
concerns, a reference to Article 51(4) of the Statute was introduced to the amendment, 
thus clarifying that the amended rule would not be applied retroactively to the 
detriment of accused persons who were under investigation, on trial, or convicted at 
the time of the new Rule’s passage.52 
These amendments appeared to herald a new era of cooperation between the 
Court and the ASP, and the success of the collaborative process as set out in the 
Roadmap on reviewing the procedures of the Court. 53  However, in the same 
Resolution adopting the amendments to Rules 68 and 100, the ASP also adopted some 
amendments to Rule 134, which had not come through the Roadmap process. The 
new Rule 134bis provides for participation via video-link, while the new Rule 134ter 
sets out a framework for excusing an accused person from presence at trial. The new 
Rule 134quater relates specifically to those persons mandated ‘to fulfill extraordinary 
public duties’ who wish to be excused from attending their trial.54 This amendment is 
notable, because it was proposed by States Parties and thus did not follow the new                                                         
48 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/12/44, 24 October 2013. 
49 ASP, Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/11/Res.7, 27 November 2013.  
50 Ibid., §§ 5-7.  
51 See further, M. Fairlie, ‘The Abiding Problem of Witness Statements in International Criminal 
Trials’, 50 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2017, forthcoming); Y. McDermott, 
Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford University Press, 2016) 90-92. 
52ASP, Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 49, § 2.  
53 Set out in Annex I to the 2013 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, supra note 45. 
54 Rules 134bis, ter, and quater. 
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collaborative model set out in the Roadmap; therefore, little or no consultation with 
the Court was carried out prior to its adoption.55 Moreover, the new amendment was a 
clear reaction to case law in the Ruto and Sang case, where the accused Ruto had 
asked to be excused from trial to enable him to carry out his duties as Deputy 
President of Kenya.56 The Appeals Chamber had rejected the suggestion put forward 
by a number of states, acting as amici curiae, he should be entitled to a blanket 
excusal from presence at trial as a result of his senior political role.57 This amendment 
of the Court’s legal framework to fit the rather unique circumstances of a particular 
case highlights that the Roadmap process of close collaboration between the Court 
and the ASP, whilst strongly encouraged, cannot exclude the future amendment of 
Rules through other means set out in the ICC Statute. It has also been argued, from a 
more theoretical standpoint, that this type of amendment can lead to incoherence and 
‘a loss of the abstract-general character constitutive of a law that is meant to apply to 
any situation’.58 
The politicisation of Rule amendments was not to end with the amended Rules 
134bis-quater. Shortly after the amendments to Rule 68 were passed, the Prosecutor 
sought to introduce material under the revised Rule in the Ruto and Sang case.59 The 
Trial Chamber held that, notwithstanding the reference to Article 51(4) in the newly 
adopted Rule, it could be applied retroactively to admit witness statements to the 
evidentiary record.60 It found that the reference to Article 51(4) could not be read as 
implying that the ASP did not want the amended Rule to apply retroactively to any 
case that was ongoing at the time of its adoption; the Rule could only not apply if it 
would apply retroactively ‘to the detriment of the person who is being [...] 
prosecuted.’61 The African Union intervened as an amicus curiae in the appeal of this 
decision, arguing that the Trial Chamber had misconstrued the intentions of the 
                                                        
55 Ambach, supra note 5, 864-865. 
56 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, Ruto and Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-777), Trial Chamber V(a), 18 June 2013; Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of the Trial Chamber V (a) of 18.6.2013 entitled ‘Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request 
for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’, Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1066), Appeals 
Chamber, 25 October 2013.  
57 Appeals Chamber, ibid., § 13.  
58 Ambach, supra note 41, 1291.  
59 Decision on the Prosecution Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, Ruto and Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-1938), Trial Chamber V(a), 19 August 2015, § 1. 
60 Ibid., § 19. 
61 Ibid. 
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ASP. 62  Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber held that to apply the amended Rule 
retroactively would give rise to unfairness.63 However, the experience was to mark a 
turning point for the increased politicisation of Rule amendments by the ASP. While 
the matter was pending before the Appeals Chamber, Kenya sought to use the ASP’s 
2015 session to further clarify the scope of the amended Rule’s application,64 a move 
that was criticised as attempting to interfere with the Court’s independence.65 
Nevertheless, attempts persisted to keep the Roadmap process on track.66 In 
2014, the Working Group on Lessons Learned put forward two sets of proposals for 
Rule amendments.67 Under the ‘language cluster’ set were proposed amendments to 
Rules 76(3) and 144(2)(b) (allowing for partial translations of prosecution witness 
statements and certain decisions, where not inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused) and Rule 101 (allowing the commencement of deadlines and time limits to 
be delayed until translations have been received). These proposals were influenced by 
the Banda and Jerbo case, where the process of translating all prosecution witness 
statements into Zaghawa, a language spoken by fewer than 200,000 people in 
Sudan,68 had taken over two years, at a not insignificant cost to the Court.69 The 
Working Group on Amendments noted support for these proposed amendments,70 but 
declined to submit a recommendation that the ASP adopt these proposals, on the 
grounds that some delegations had reservations on their compatibility with the right to 
                                                        
62 Judgment on the appeals of Mr William Samoei Ruto and Mr Joshua Arap Sang against the decision 
of Trial Chamber V(A) of 19 August 2015 entitled “Decision on Prosecution Request for Admission of 
Prior Recorded Testimony”, Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2024), Appeals Chamber, 12 February 
2016, §11.  
63 Ibid., § 94. 
64 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to the 
President of the Assembly of States Parties, 13 October 2015, online at 
http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/Kenya-Formal-request.pdf. 
65  Letter from President, Prosecutor and Registrar of the ICC to ASP President Sidiki Kaba, 13 
November 2015, online at 
http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/file/ICC%20Documents/Letter%20from%20the%20Court%27s%20P
rincipals%20to%20President%20of%20the%20ASP%20in%20ant___%20(1).pdf. 
66  Notwithstanding the adoption of Rules 134bis-ter in 2013, the Bureau of the ASP noted its 
commitment to the process, ‘so as to avoid a disparate and unstructured approach to any proposals on 
amending the criminal procedures’. 
67 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/13/28, 28 November 2014, Annex I, 
Appendixes II and III. 
68 ‘Zaghawa’, Ethnologue, online at http://www.ethnologue.com/18/language/zag/. 
69 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, supra note 66, Annex I, Appendix III. In 
2016, the WGA noted some further ‘arguments put forward by the Court in support of the proposals, 
including the absence of a written form of some languages and the considerable time required to train 
translators in the Lubanga case’: Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/15/24, 8 
November 2016, § 22.  
70 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/14/34, 16 November 2015, § 22.  
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a fair trial.71 Those concerns have persisted (arguably rightly so72) with regard to the 
proposed amendment of Rule 76(3) on the translation of prosecution witness 
statements.73 However, the Working Group on Amendments found sufficient support 
across delegations for the proposed amendments to Rules 101 and 144(2)(b),74 and 
following its recommendation, the ASP adopted these amendments on 24 November 
2016,75 two years after the amendments were first proposed by the judges’ Working 
Group. The proposals on Rule 76(3) remain under consideration.76 These examples 
highlight the unwieldiness of the Roadmap process in practice, and perhaps illustrate 
‘that the Roadmap process did not provide an opportune means to achieve tangible 
efficiency gains in the ICC’s criminal process’.77 
This experience was confirmed by the ASP’s response to proposed Rule 
140bis, which had been put forward by the judges’ Working Group on Lessons 
Learned at the same time as the ‘language cluster’ of amendments.78 The proposed 
new 140bis would allow a particular stage of the trial to continue in the temporary 
absence of one judge, where there were unforeseen and unavoidable reasons for the 
judge’s absence, and provided that the continuation had the consent of the parties and 
was in the interests of justice. 79  The Study Group on Governance noted some 
delegations’ concerns about the compatibility of this proposal with the spirit and letter 
of the Statute.80 Following some amendments to the Court’s proposed Rule 140bis, 
the Study Group on Governance conveyed it, together with the Court’s proposed text 
and the views expressed by the various delegations, to the ASP’s Working Group on 
Amendments for its consideration. 81  The Working Group on Amendments, in 
considering both proposed Rule 140bis and the language amendments in 2015, noted 
that it would focus on the language amendments instead of the amendment on absence 
of a judge, as ‘there was less divergence of views’ on these proposals, compared to                                                         
71 Ibid., §§ 28-30.  
72  McDermott, Fairness, supra note 51, 66-67, noting the higher standard included in the ICC’s 
statutory framework. 
73 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, supra note 69, § 23.  
74 Ibid., §§ 27-28.  
75 ASP, Resolution on amendments to rule 101 and rule 144, paragraph 2(b), of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, ICC-ASP/15/Res.4, 24 November 2016. 
76 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, supra note 69, § 28. 
77 Ambach, supra note 5, 864.  
78 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, supra note 66, Annex I, Appendixes II and III.  
79 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, supra note 66, Annex I, Report of the Study 
Group on Governance Cluster I in relation to amendment proposals to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence put forward by the Court, § 13.  
80 Ibid., § 15.  
81 Ibid., §§ 19-21.  
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the range of views on the proposed Rule 140bis.82 The proposed Rule 140bis was not 
mentioned in the 2016 Report of the Working Group on Amendments; 83 we can 
therefore assume that the decision has been taken to shelve these proposals 
indefinitely. 
The judges’ relative lack of success as regards their proposed amendments, 
and the hurdles faced even for those amendments that were ultimately passed, may 
well have a chilling effect on the future operation of the Roadmap. Indeed, the Court 
informed the ASP in 2015 that normative changes to the Court’s legal framework 
‘would only be proposed if an issue could not be resolved via changes of practice.’84 
It is notable that the last proposed amendment put forward by the Working Group on 
Lessons Learned was to Rule 165, in July 2015.85 While awaiting the proposals on 
Rule 165 to go through the amendment process, the judges of the Court unanimously 
adopted a provisional amendment to Rule 165 in February 2016, 86  using their 
authority to adopt provisional rules under Article 51(3). The provisionally amended 
Rule allows a single judge to exercise functions that would normally be carried out by 
a full Chamber, in proceedings under Article 70 of the Statute (i.e. for offences 
against the administration of justice).87 Appeal functions are carried out by a panel of 
three judges instead of the full Appeals Chamber under the amended Rule.88 The 
decision to proceed in this manner met with a mixed response from States Parties in 
the Working Group on Amendments. 89  Whilst some delegations supported the 
substance of the amendment and the judges’ actions in attempting to make Article 70 
proceedings more efficient, others raised concerns that the criteria of Article 51 had 
not been met, and that the judges’ actions went against the intention for a structured 
dialogue between the Court and the ASP on Rule amendments, as set out in the 
Roadmap.90 One delegation went so far as to argue ‘that the legislative process had 
been hijacked.’91 Ultimately, owing to differences of opinions amongst delegations,                                                         
82 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, supra note 70, § 24.  
83 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, supra note 69. 
84 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/14/30, 16 November 2015, § 14. 
85 Ibid., Annex II, Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learnt to the Study Group on Governance: 
Cluster I: Expediting the Criminal Process: Progress Report on Clusters A, B, C and E, § 71. 
86 Report on the Adoption by the Judges of Provisional Amendments to Rule 165 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, 29 February 2016. 
87 Ibid., § 3. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, supra note 69. 
90 Ibid., §§ 35-36. 
91 Ibid., § 35.  
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the Working Group on Amendments felt unable to put forward a final 
recommendation to the ASP on the adoption or otherwise of the amended Rule 165.92 
An interesting question then arose as to whether the provisionally amended Rule 
could continue to apply; as will be recalled, provisional Rules are to be applied ‘until 
adopted, amended or rejected’93 by the ASP, but of course the ASP’s non-action is 
neither a formal rejection nor an adoption or amendment. Kenya issued a strong 
statement urging the Court to continue not to apply the Rule, in order ‘to avoid legal 
absurdities’.94 Conversely, Belgium argued that the Rule remained applicable, noting 
‘that it is not up to the Assembly to dictate to the Court the way in which the latter 
should accomplish this task.’95  
On the one hand, the above impasses and difficulties could be seen as a 
positive reflection of the Court’s legal framework, insofar as they reflect the ASP’s 
acting as guardian of the Statute and the rights of accused persons before the Court. It 
might be argued that the Rome Statute’s drafters intended to ensure that judges did 
not have an untrammeled right to adopt and amend the Court’s procedure, and that 
these recent experiences give credence to that intention. On the other hand, some may 
argue that they illustrate the undesirability of leaving procedural rule amendments in 
the hands of a political body, where extraneous considerations might play into 
delegations’ support or otherwise of rules intended by the judges to enhance 
efficiency. While the ability of judges of other international criminal tribunals to 
change the framework of Rules of Procedure and Evidence to deal with situations as 
they arose was critiqued for their lack of oversight,96 at least those amendments were 
processed efficiently and in a collegiate manner. It is notable that many of the issues 
that have resulted in a stalemate at the ASP – including judicial absences and 
translation issues – were dealt with expeditiously at the ICTY.97 Moreover, given that 
the judges of the International Criminal Court have agreed that they ‘would try to                                                         
92 Ibid., § 38.  
93 Art 51(3) ICCSt.  
94  ASP, Official Records, 15th Session, 16-24 November 2016, Annex V, Statement by Kenya 
concerning the report of the Working Group on Amendments to the Assembly at its seventh plenary 
meeting, on 22 November 2016. 
95 Ibid., Annex VI, Statement by Belgium concerning the report of the Working Group on Amendments 
to the Assembly at its seventh plenary meeting, on 22 November 2016. 
96 P. Murphy, ‘No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence is a Serious 
Flaw in International Criminal Trials’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 539; E. 
O’Sullivan and D. Montgomery, ‘The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of 
Fairness at the ICTY’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 511. 
97 Rule 15bis, ICTY RPE, adopted 17 November 1999; Rule 3(F), ICTY RPE, amended 25 July 1997; 
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avoid proposing amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and rather take 
measures to expedite proceedings through practice changes’, 98  these extensive 
discussions may conversely lead to an increased power of judges in amending 
procedure, and in forums that are less transparent than the ASP, in future. It is in this 
context that the Chambers Practice Manual was developed. 
 
3. The Character, Scope and Context of the Chambers Practice Manual 
A. The Development of the Manual 
The Manual’s introduction, written by the President of the Pre-Trial Division, Judge 
Cuno Tarfusser, tells us that it was the product of discussions since April 2015 
between the five Pre-Trial Judges, attempting to resolve issues that had arisen in the 
Court’s first years of operation and reflect on lessons learned thus far.99 Whether the 
five Pre-Trial judges were completely in agreement as to the content and effect of the 
Manual is open to some debate – as shall be seen in Part 4 below, two of these five 
judges have since issued strong dissents to date on issues relating to the Manual.100 At 
a judicial retreat in Nuremberg in June 2015, the Manual was endorsed by all of the 
Judges of the Court, who recommended that it be made public.101 
 In 2016, an amended version of the Manual – now called the ‘Chambers 
Practice Manual’, as opposed to the ‘Pre-Trial Practice Manual’ – was released.102 
The change in nomenclature was to reflect the fact that the guidance therein no longer 
solely related to the pre-trial stage of proceedings. 103  However, the focus of the 
Manual remains predominantly on pre-trial procedure. A second amended version 
was released in 2017.104  
 As outlined in Part 2 above, the Roadmap process for Rule amendments has 
perhaps not been as successful as was originally hoped in affecting procedural 
changes in an efficient and collaborative manner. Thus, the judges of the Court have 
determined that they will attempt to bring about efficiencies in a manner that falls 
short of full amendment to the RPE, and the Manual is a clear facet of that strategy.                                                          
98 Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, President of the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the 
Council of Europe Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI), Strasbourg, 3 
March 2016. 
99 Pre-Trial Practice Manual, supra note 2, 4.  
100 See below, section 4.A.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1.   
103 Ibid., 4.  
104 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1.   
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The President of the Court, speaking in 2016, noted that the intention to steer clear of 
formal Rule amendments: 
 
[I]s now reflected in a Chambers’ Practice Manual, which initially started as a 
Pre-Trial Practice Manual, reflecting the agreements we reached during and 
following the retreat on pre-trial proceedings and issues that arise between 
pre- trial and trial… [W]e are trying to avoid amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence because practice changes provide more flexibility and 
the amendment procedure is cumbersome. Therefore, where possible, we try 
instead to address issues through agreements to be reflected in the Manual or 
amendments to the Regulations of the Court.105 
 
Thus, the intention to use the Manual as an alternative to the Court’s formal processes 
for the amendment of Rules of Procedure and Evidence could hardly be more explicit. 
Early scholarship on the Manual has praised the use of the Manual in this way, insofar 
as it avoids cumbersome processes and obstructionist state practices.106 However, it 
does give rise to some serious questions about the weight to be given to the Manual as 
a non-binding guidance document. When a conflict between a provision in the 
Manual and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence arises, it is of course clear that the 
latter, as a formally binding source of law before the ICC, should prevail. How, then, 
can formal Rule amendment through the ASP be avoided through practice changes 
enshrined in the Manual? The judges’ intentions here may be laudable, but may well 
lead to further incoherence and difficulties as the Manual and related practice 
progresses.  
 
B. The Content of the Manual 
The Chambers Practice Manual is divided into three parts: Part A on pre-trial 
proceedings, Part B on issues related to trial proceedings before they begin, and Part                                                         
105 Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 98, 4. While it falls outside the scope of this article, it is 
worthy of note that Regulations have been amended since this speech, highlighting another way that 
Rule amendments have been avoided. In December 2016, amendments to Regulations 20, 24, 33, 34, 
36, 38, and 44, described as ‘technical in nature, concerning page limits, time limits and other 
procedural issues’, were adopted. The distinction between procedural issues requiring amendments to 
the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, those requiring revised Regulations, and those requiring merely 
‘practice changes’ later codified in the Practice Manual is unclear. Some of the issues covered in the 
latest tranche of Regulation amendments have the potential for significant implications for the parties, 
in particular the changes to Regulations 24 and 34 on the permitted scope for replies. Other issues 
addressed in the amendments, such as time limits, are also discussed in the Practice Manual, 
particularly in relation to pre-trial time limits. 
106 Ambos, supra note 5, 661; Ambach, supra note 5; Ambach, supra note 40; J. Powderly, The Role of 
the Judge in the Development of International Criminal Law (PhD thesis, 2017, on file with author), 
224. 
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C on ‘issues related to various stages of proceedings’. An Annex, newly introduced in 
2016, contains a ‘Protocol on the Handling of Confidential Information during 
Investigations and Contact between a Party or Participant and Witnesses of the 
Opposing Party or of a Participant’. The latter protocol was clearly influenced by the 
Bemba et al. case, where all five defendants were found guilty of having corruptly 
influenced witnesses, an offence under Article 70 of the Court’s Statute.107 Part A 
spans pages 6-19 of the Manual, and remains broadly unchanged from the first 
iteration of the Pre-Trial Practice Manual. Part A covers such issues as: the issuance 
of an arrest warrant, disclosure of evidence at pre-trial, and the confirmation of the 
charges hearing and decision. Part B, newly introduced in 2017, governs issues 
surrounding the first status conference, trial preparation matters, and review of 
detention prior to the start of trial. Part C, on ‘various stages of proceedings’ 
comprises six pages and the annexed Protocol, and outlines the procedure for victims 
to be admitted to participate in proceedings and exceptions to the redaction of 
information for the purposes of disclosure. The Manual can be distinguished from 
Practice Directions before other international criminal tribunals, which are issued by 
the President after appropriate consultation to address ‘detailed aspects of the conduct 
of proceedings before the Tribunal’.108  
 The Manual is designed to be a reflection of the Court’s ‘best practices’. In his 
introduction to the original Pre-Trial Practice Manual, Judge Tarfusser noted that: 
‘[A]fter more than 10 years of activity, it was considered vital to reflect on the at 
times inconsistent practice of the different Pre-Trial Chambers, and record what has 
been identified as best practice to be followed in pre-trial proceedings.’ 109  This 
touches on an important point – that what can be seen as ‘best’ practices are not 
necessarily consistent practices of the Court. The judges’ methodology for identifying 
best practices, where previous Court practice was divided on a matter, is unclear and 
is not given a great deal of elucidation in the Manual. The introduction to the third 
edition notes that the best practices identified ‘are based on the experience and 
expertise of judges across trials at the Court’,110 but the source of some parts of the 
Manual is far from clear. As the International Bar Association noted in 2016, it may                                                         
107 Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Bemba et al. (ICC-
01/05-01/13-1989), Trial Chamber VII, 19 October 2016. 
108 ICTY RPE, Rule 19(B); ICTR RPE, Rule 19(B); SCSL RPE, Rule 19(B); RSCSL RPE, Rule 19(C); 
MICT RPE, Rule 23(B); STL RPE, Rule 32(E).  
109 Pre-Trial Practice Manual, supra note 2, Introduction.  
110 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, Introduction.  
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have been helpful for the Manual to be annotated with relevant ICC jurisprudence, 
illustrating how prior practice adopted by the majority of Chambers does support 
particular provisions in the Manual. 111  Alternatively, a Briefing Note or similar 
document to accompany subsequent amendments to the Manual could note the source 
of practice for amended provisions. If the Manual is intended to serve as a 
compendium of best practice developed in the case law of the Court, some reference 
to the source of that practice would be helpful for practitioners, should they seek to 
challenge the applicability of a particular section of the Manual, or differentiate the 
case at hand from the original case(s) where the practice was developed.  
 Interestingly, some aspects of the Manual do appear to depart from previous 
practice at the Court, in particular as regards issues surrounding the confirmation 
proceedings. To give an example, the Manual states on two separate occasions that no 
submission of any ‘in-depth analysis chart’ shall be required of either party.112 These 
charts, which link the evidence relied upon or disclosed to each constituent element of 
the charges, 113 were ordered to be submitted by the Prosecutor in Ruto et al., 114 
Ongwen, 115  and Bemba, 116  amongst others. 117  Indeed, in Ongwen, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber determined that the in-depth analysis chart was ‘embedded in the statutory 
documents of the Court.’118 In addressing the ASP in 2010, the then-President of the 
Court, Judge Song, hailed the introduction of the in-depth analysis chart as one of the 
Court’s achievements in ensuring the fairness and expediency of proceedings.119 In                                                         
111 International Bar Association, Evidence Matters in ICC Trials, August 2016. 
112 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 10, 14.  
113 Decision on the Defence Requests in Relation to the Submission of a Comprehensive In-Depth 
Analysis Chart, Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-191), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 July 2011, 5. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, Ongwen (ICC-
02/04-01/15-203), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 27 February 2015. 
116 Decision on the ‘Prosecution's Submissions on the Trial Chamber's 8 December 2009 Oral Order 
Requesting Updating of the In-Depth Analysis Chart’, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-682), Trial Chamber 
III, 29 January 2010. 
117 e.g. Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, Ntaganda 
(ICC-01/04-02/06-47), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 12 April 2013. 
118  Supra note 115, § 39. This decision was overturned in part by the Appeals Chamber, which 
nevertheless held that the Single Judge had ‘the discretion to issue orders to ensure that disclosure takes 
place under satisfactory conditions. Such orders may address various aspects of the disclosure process, 
including the production and submission of aids or tools such as in-depth analysis charts’: Judgment 
on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled “Decision Setting 
the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters”, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-251), 
Appeals Chamber, 17 June 2015, § 33. The Appeals Chamber found that the Single Judge had not 
properly exercised her discretion by ordering the production of in-depth analysis charts without first 
consulting with the parties: ibid, §§ 36-43. 
119 Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Assembly of 
States Parties, 9th Session, New York, 6 December 2010, 3.  
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Bemba, the Appeals Chamber rejected the accused’s contention that he was not 
properly informed of the charges against him with explicit reference to the fact that 
the Prosecution had submitted an updated in-depth analysis chart, setting out how the 
evidence related to the allegations.120 The only legal authority stating that an in-depth 
analysis chart is not required is a decision of Single Judge Tarfusser in the Bemba et 
al. case from January 2014.121 Thus, it is difficult to conclude that this change in 
approach is reflective of consistent practice from across the Court, let alone best 
practice. 
 
C. The Nature of the Manual as a Source of Law 
The sources of law applicable before the Court are clearly set out in Article 21 of the 
ICC Statute. The Court’s primary sources of law are its Statute, Elements of Crimes, 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.122 Where appropriate, the Court can also have 
recourse to the rules and principles of international law, including treaties and 
customary international law,123 and should neither the Court’s own legal framework 
or international law provide guidance, the Court can apply general principles of law 
derived from national legal systems.124 While judges can apply rules and principles 
from earlier decisions of the Court, 125  there is no formally binding doctrine of 
precedent. The term ‘may apply’ in Article 21(2) makes it clear that judges are by no 
means obliged to follow previous practice.126 It therefore goes without saying that the 
Chambers Practice Manual can neither be seen as a source of law in itself, nor can the 
fact that it draws inspiration from previous decisions of the Court mean that the 
judges are in any way bound to follow ‘best practices’ as set out in the Manual. This 
was recognised by the Appeals Chamber in Gbagbo, when it referred to the Pre-Trial                                                         
120 Judgment on the appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prosecutor against the decision 
of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission into evidence of materials contained in the 
prosecution's list of evidence”, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-1386), Appeals Chamber, 3 May 2011, § 63. 
121 Decision on the ‘Defence request for an in-depth analysis chart’ submitted by the Defence for Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba et al. (ICC-01/05-01/13-134), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 28 January 
2014. 
122 Art 21(1)(a) ICCSt. 
123 Art 21(1)(b) ICCSt. 
124 Art 21(1)(a) ICCSt. 
125 Art 21(2) ICCSt. 
126 Decision On The Prosecution's Application For Leave To Appeal The Chamber's Decision Of 17 
January 2006 On The Applications For Participation In The Proceedings Of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 
3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-135), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 March 
2006. See further, G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC’ in C. 
Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 
2015), 411, 422-425. 
 20 
Practice Manual as ‘an explanatory document’, providing only ‘recommendations’ for 
the Court. 127  An introduction to the third edition of the Manual in May 2017 
confirms, for the first time in the Manual’s history, that the Manual is not intended as 
a binding instrument; rather, ‘it contains general recommendations and guidelines 
reflecting best practices.’128  
 However, it is clear that there is a perception within the Court that the Practice 
Manual represents a more efficient means to enact procedural reforms without having 
recourse to formal means such as amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As 
mentioned above, the Report of the Bureau on the Study Group on Governance 
presented to the Assembly of States Parties in November 2015 noted that a 
representative of the Presidency of the Court had advised the Group that the judges 
were focusing on changes in practice and harmonisation across Chambers.129 To this 
end, it was reported, changes through formal means, such as amendment of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, ‘would only be proposed if an issue could not be resolved 
via changes of practice’, and that therefore the Court would not be proposing any 
Rule amendments in 2015.130 This intention is reflected in the 2016 statements of the 
President of the Court, noted above. 131  While some might see this less formal 
approach as being preferable to the cumbersome procedure of normative reforms, 
including formally amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,132 this does raise 
concerns insofar as it clearly disregards the intention of the Rome Statute’s drafters to 
take procedural law-making out of the hands of the Court’s judges. Moreover, as shall 
be discussed in detail in Part 4, some Chambers have showed an unwillingness to act 
contrary to the Manual’s guidance. 
 Even if the Manual were to be seen as merely a guidance document, we might 
ask whether it oversteps that role in the wording of certain provisions. While guidance 
to the parties is often provided in the form of encouragement in the Manual, 133                                                         
127 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Gbagbo against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled 
“Decision giving notice pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé (ICC- 02/11-01/15-369), Appeals Chamber, 18 December 2015, § 54. 
128 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, Introduction. 
129 Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, supra note 66, § 14.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 98. 
132 K. Ambos, ‘Fairness and Expediency in International Criminal Procedure’, in J. Jackson and S. 
Summers (eds), Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Individual Rights and Procedural 
Forms (Hart, 2017) (forthcoming; on file with author). 
133 E.g. Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 13 ‘The inclusion, in the Prosecutor’s submissions 
for the purpose of the confirmation hearing … of footnotes itemising the evidence supporting a factual 
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instruction to Chambers is much more explicit. For example, Pre-Trial Chambers are 
instructed that ‘[n]o footnote (whether internal cross-references or hyperlinks to the 
evidence) can be included in the charges’,134 and a 924-word text to be inserted into a 
decision on exceptions to prosecutorial disclosure is explicitly provided.135 This text 
sets out thirteen different categories of information that can be redacted by the 
Prosecutor without authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the categorizations 
are taken directly from a decision of Single Judge Tarfusser of April 2015,136 five 
months before the publication of the first edition of the Manual. The explicit inclusion 
of text to be used by Chambers does appear to go beyond the boundaries of what 
might be expected of a merely advisory document. The text in question states that 
‘The following procedure shall apply for exceptions to disclosure by the Prosecutor 
which are subject to judicial control, i.e. under Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.’ 137  The use of the word ‘shall’ does not suggest that 
Chambers are granted leeway in deciding what procedure applies in such 
circumstances. Moreover, we might ask whether the setting out of what effectively 
constitute exceptions to Rules 81(2) and 81(4) oversteps the role that might be 
expected of the Manual,138 or whether the establishment of such a procedure is the 
kind of change that requires a formal amendment of the Rule. The wording and style 
of the Practice Manual stands in contrast to comparable documents, such as the 
International Court of Justice’s Practice Directions, which uses more nuanced 
phrases, such as ‘the Court will find it very helpful if…’139 and ‘[t]he Court wishes to 
discourage…’.140 
 
4. The Impact of the Chambers Practice Manual in Practice 
 
It is beyond question from the above that the Chambers Practice Manual represents, in 
principle, nothing more than a guidance document that Chambers should not feel                                                                                                                                                               
allegation – preferably with hyperlinks to Ringtail – is encouraged.’ (emphasis added) 
134 Ibid., 14.  
135 Ibid., 24-25. 
136 Decision on issues related to disclosure and exceptions thereto, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-224), 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 April 2015. 
137 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 24 (emphasis added).  
138 J. Lindenmann, ‘Stärkung der Effizienz der Verfahren vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof’ 
10/2015 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2015), 529, at 529-530 (illustrating some 
potential examples that would constitute practice changes (‘Praxisänderungen’)).  
139 International Court of Justice, Practice Directions, October 2001 (as amended on 20 January 2009 
and 21 March 2013), Practice Direction VI. 
140 Ibid., Practice Direction I. 
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obliged to consistently follow, but that in practice, it has been broadly perceived as an 
alternative to normative amendments (to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Regulations of the Court, and Statute). Beyond that widespread perception, it is 
important to examine the actual influence of the Manual in practice. As shall be 
shown through a case study of a distinct issue – the quality and quantity of evidence 
required for a Confirmation of the Charges decision – the majority of judges of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber have perhaps shown an undue deference to the Manual, and this 
has lead to disagreements in practice between the majority and two of the five Pre-
Trial judges. The treatment of the Manual as though it were formally binding on the 
Chambers of the Court, in turn, raises issues surrounding legal certainty and 
predictability, fairness, and coherence.  
 
A. Evidentiary Thresholds for Confirmation of Charges Decisions 
The ICC’s statutory framework introduced a procedural hurdle for the prosecution to 
overcome before a case could proceed to trial, through its confirmation of the charges 
procedure. Pursuant to Article 61(7) of the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber must 
establish ‘whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe’ that the accused committed the crimes charged.141 In its first ten years of 
operation, four of 14 cases before the Court had fallen at this procedural stage, with 
the Pre-Trial Chamber refusing to confirm the charges on the basis that the evidence 
before it did not meet the standard of proof (‘substantial grounds to believe’) for that 
stage of proceedings.142 Thus, a key issue before the Court has been the amount and 
quality of the evidence that the Prosecutor should place before the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in order to cross this evidentiary threshold. On the one hand, the Court is adamant that 
                                                        
141 Art 61(7) ICCSt. See further, I. Stegmiller, ‘Confirmation of Charges’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2015), 891; T. Mariniello 
and N. Pons, ‘The Confirmation of Charges at the International Criminal Court: a Tale of Two 
Models’, in T. Mariniello (ed.), The International Criminal Court: In Search of its Purpose and 
Identity (Routledge, 2015), 217. 
142 These are: Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-243), Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 8 February 2010; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-
01/10-465), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 December 2011; the case of Kosgey in Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Ruto et al. (ICC-
01/09-01/11-373), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 February 2012, and the case of Hussein Ali in Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Muthaura et al. 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-382), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 29 January 2012. See further W.A. Schabas, ‘Thoughts 
on the Kenya Confirmation Decisions’, PhD Studies in Human Rights, 30 January 2012, depicting this 
as a ‘failure rate of 29%’.  
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the Confirmation of Charges procedure should not become a ‘mini-trial’, 143  and 
previous confirmation decisions had been critiqued for their length and detail.144 On 
the other hand, the presumption of innocence necessitates that a person should not be 
put on a trial for a crime where there is a lack of sufficiently compelling charges 
going beyond mere theory or suspicion.145 The fact that four cases had failed to reach 
the evidentiary threshold shows the value of the process for protecting both the right 
to liberty of suspects and the resources of the Court, by ensuring that prosecutions 
where there is no realistic prospect of success are not pursued. While other legal 
systems subject charges to less searching scrutiny before cases can proceed to trial, 
the Confirmation of Charges hearing is an important part of the ICC’s legal 
framework.146 
 The Chambers Practice Manual attempts to relieve some of the uncertainty 
surrounding the evidentiary threshold by establishing clear guidelines on the scope 
and quality of evidence required for the confirmation stage of proceedings. The 
Manual establishes that live witnesses are not required at this stage of proceedings,147 
that there is no need for parties to prepare an ‘in-depth analysis chart’ or similar, 
linking the evidence to the charges,148 and that Pre-Trial Chambers should not provide 
footnotes in the ‘charges’ section of their confirmation of the charges decisions, 
linking the charges to the evidence presented to the Chamber.149 This latter point 
stands in contrast to recent academic analysis, which has argued for factual findings 
to be more explicitly linked to the evidence received by the Chamber, not less.150 
Indeed, it could be argued that the Manual effectively lowers the evidentiary threshold 
for confirmation hearings – previous practice had explicitly required that cases be as 
                                                        
143  Decision on the confirmation of charges, Katanga and Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-717), Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 13 October 2008, § 64.   
144 See further, V. Nerlich, ‘The Confirmation of Charges Procedure at the International Criminal 
Court: Advance or Failure?’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 1339. 
145 Decision on the confirmation of charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, 14 May 2007, § 37. 
146 Nerlich, supra note 144; W.A. Schabas, E. Chaitidou, and M. El-Zeidy, ‘Article 61’, in O. Triffterer 
and K. Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn: 
Hart/Beck, 2016) 1484. 
147 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 14. 
148 Ibid., 10, 13; see supra, text to notes 106-114, for further analysis.  
149 Ibid., 12.  
150  E.g. M. Cupido, ‘Facing Facts in International Criminal Law: A Casuistic Model of Judicial 
Reasoning’, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016) 1; Y. McDermott, ‘Inferential 
Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials’, 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2015) 507. 
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‘trial-ready’ as possible at this stage of proceedings,151 and had noted that it was 
important that cases did not proceed to trial where the evidence was ‘riddled with 
ambiguities’.152 Thus, the previous practice does seem, on its face, to have required a 
level of evaluation of the evidence that appears to be minimised by the Manual.  
 This issue came to a head in relation to the first two Confirmation of the 
Charges decisions issued after the publication of the Pre-Trial Practice Manual – in 
the cases against Ahmad al-Faqi Al-Mahdi153 and Dominic Ongwen.154 Both cases 
illustrate a deep division between judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the extent to 
which evidence should be thoroughly evaluated for the purposes of establishing 
whether there are substantial grounds to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been committed. They also highlight a difference of opinion on the 
extent to which Chambers are bound to follow the guidance set out in the Manual.  
In Ongwen, the defence sought leave to appeal the Confirmation of Charges 
decision on the basis that it was insufficiently reasoned. 155  It is notable that the 
Manual sets out strict limits on the extent of Pre-Trial Chambers’ reasoning, noting 
that it should be confined ‘to what is necessary and sufficient for the Chamber’s 
findings on the charges’,156 on the basis that the Pre-Trial Chamber should not pre-
adjudicate matters that are to be considered at trial.157 The Manual also sets out a 
detailed structure for Confirmation decisions – each decision should distinguish 
between the ‘factual findings’, the ‘legal findings’, and the ‘operative part’ of the 
decision, reproducing verbatim the charges put forward by the Prosecutor that have 
been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.158 The intention appears to be, because 
ICC proceedings do not have indictments per se, 159  the ‘operative part’ of the                                                         
151 E.g. Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 
December 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’, Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10-
514), Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012, § 44. Trial-readiness is noted as desirable in Chambers Practice 
Manual, supra note 1, 8.  
152 Ibid., § 46.  
153 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-
01/15-84), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 March 2016. 
154 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-422), 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 March 2016. 
155 Defence Request for Leave to Appeal Issues in Confirmation of Charges Decision, Ongwen (ICC-
02/04-01/15-423), Defence, 29 March 2016, §§ 25-35. 
156 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 13.  
157 Mariniello and Pons, supra note 141, 234; M. Miraglia, ‘Admissibility of Evidence, Standard of 
Proof, and Nature of the Decision in the ICC Confirmation of Charges in Lubanga’ 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2008), 496, 497. 
158 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 16-18.  
159 For further discussion, see V. Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and 
the European Court of Human Rights: Procedure and Evidence (Nijhoff, 2008), 3.  
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confirmation decision would become the conclusive statement of the charges faced by 
the accused as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.160 The Manual states that only 
the operative part of the decision will be binding, and ‘after the charges are confirmed 
(in whole or in part) by the Pre-Trial Chamber there shall be no discussion or 
litigation at trial as to their formulation, scope or content.’161 
The defence argument in Ongwen was that the Confirmation decision was 
‘riddled with findings whose basis and reasoning is not clear.’162 Some examples 
given included the factual finding at paragraph 56 of the decision, stating that ‘the 
evidence overwhelmingly shows’ an effective hierarchical structure within the LRA, 
but without reference to any evidence, 163  and the findings on communications 
between Ongwen and Joseph Kony, again unreferenced to the evidence presented.164 
Indeed, the length of the Confirmation decision and the degree to which the factual 
findings are linked to particular pieces of evidence represents a notable departure 
from previous practice. The ‘findings’ part of the decision spans fewer than 50 pages 
with a total of 37 footnotes,165 which is remarkable, in light of the fact that 70 counts 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes were confirmed.166 The ‘charges’ part of 
the decision, which, as required by the Manual, does not cross-reference any 
evidence,167 is almost as long as the first part of the Decision, at 33 pages long. By 
contrast, the confirmation decision issued in the case of Charles Blé Goudé in 
December 2014, confirming four counts of crimes against humanity, contains a 
section dedicated to ‘analysis of the evidence’ (roughly equivalent to the ‘findings’ 
section in the new format for confirmation decisions) that spans 72 pages with no 
                                                        
160 This is probably preferable to the approach taken in the Katanga and Chui confirmation decision, 
supra note 143, where the decision concludes with a number of paragraphs of narrative; the new 
approach makes it more clear as to precisely which aspects of the charges have been confirmed. 
161 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 16. This guidance in the Manual has not been followed by 
the Chamber in Gbagbo, as discussed infra, text to note 201. 
162 Defence request, supra note 155, § 27. There were four other issues included in this Request to 
Appeal the Confirmation decision, but only the issue of judicial reasoning (or lack thereof) is relevant 
for this piece. 
163 Ibid., § 27 
164  Ibid., § 28; see e.g. Ongwen Confirmation Decision, supra note 154, § 78 (‘The evidence 
demonstrates that Dominic Ongwen devised the plan to attack Lukodi, and sought and obtained 
permission from Joseph Kony for the attack – this particular radio communication was intercepted on 
17 May 2004.’), which includes no footnote to the relevant evidence that supports this finding.  
165 Ongwen Confirmation Decision, ibid., 23-70. In addition, on 19 separate pages, the testimony or 
written statements of witnesses are referred to in brackets, whereas differently-constituted Pre-Trial 
Chambers in the past would have used footnotes for such references. 
166 Ibid., 71-104. 
167 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 18. 
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fewer than 421 footnotes referencing the evidence.168 The operative part169 of the Blé 
Goudé Confirmation decision spans seven pages.170 
Despite there being a readily apparent difference in the level of detail between 
its decision and previous confirmation decisions, the Pre-Trial Chamber was less than 
impressed by the defence’s argument on the allegedly insufficient reasoning in the 
Confirmation decision; it found that any party engaged in judicial proceedings could 
potentially argue that a decision it disagreed with was not reasoned enough.171 It went 
on to hold that ‘that the decision is, in the view of the Chamber which rendered it, 
sufficiently reasoned.’ 172  This is a rather unusual response to the allegations of 
insufficient reasoning. The right to a reasoned judgment requires that a court indicates 
‘with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they based their decision’,173 so as to 
make it possible for an accused to exercise their right of appeal if there is an error in 
those grounds.174 It would surely have been preferable for the Chamber to indicate 
precisely how the grounds on which its earlier decision was based were clearly stated 
in the Confirmation decision, rather than entering into the circular argument that the 
decision was sufficiently reasoned because the Chamber that issued it thought it to be 
sufficiently reasoned.  
The Chamber further concluded that the Defence had misunderstood ‘the 
nature, purpose and structure of the Confirmation Decision’ and that its argument ‘is 
predicated on a failure to appreciate the distinction between the Chamber’s reasoning 
in the Confirmation Decision, on the one hand, and the disposition in such decision 
(i.e. the confirmed charges), on the other hand.’175 In other words, the majority noted,                                                         
168 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, Blé Goudé (ICC-02/11-02/11-
186), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 December 2014, 10-82; fns 20-441. 
169 The operative part is entitled, ‘Facts and Circumstances and their Legal Characterisation Confirmed 
by the Chamber’ in Blé Goudé, ibid. 
170 Ibid., 82-89.  
171 Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of charges, 
Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-428), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 29 April 2016, § 21. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
entitled ‘First Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 
81’, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-773), Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, § 20, citing 
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece (App. No. 12945/87), ECtHR, 16 December 1992. See further, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Chamber Decision Granting Nebojsa Pavkovic's Provisional Release, 
Milutinović (IT-05-87-AR65.1), Appeals Chamber, 1 November 2005, § 11. 
174 Lubanga, ibid.; Karyagin, Matveyev and Korolev v. Russia (App. Nos. 72839/01, 74124/01 and 
15625/02), ECtHR, 28 May 2009, § 25; Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, Nikolić (IT-02-60/1-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 8 March 2006, § 96; Judgment, Kunarac (IT-96-23 & 23/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 
12 June 2002, § 41. 
175 Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of 
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the fact that the Chamber did not explicitly link the charges confirmed to the evidence 
or findings of fact (and in so doing, followed the instruction set out in the Manual), 
did not mean that it had not provided sufficient reasoning on why those charges were 
confirmed. However, the defence request for appeal cited the factual findings, and not 
the operative part of the decision, and thus the defence did not appear to be labouring 
under a misapprehension of the nature and structure of the Confirmation Decision. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it is difficult to reconcile the Chamber’s 
interpretation that a clear link does not need to be drawn between the evidence and the 
charges with the wording of Article 61(7), which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
‘determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged’176 and to confirm the 
charges and commit the person for trial only for those charges where it has deemed 
that there is sufficient evidence to meet the evidentiary threshold of ‘substantial 
grounds to believe’.177 In addition, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence make it clear 
that Chambers, including Pre-Trial Chambers, have the authority to freely assess the 
evidence before them.178 Previous Pre-Trial Chambers, while acknowledging that the 
confirmation hearing is not a ‘mini-trial’, have explicitly acknowledged the role of the 
hearing in ensuring that ‘only those persons against whom sufficiently compelling 
charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought’ are committed for 
trial,179 and that to that end, there must be ‘concrete and tangible proof demonstrating 
a clear line of reasoning underpinning specific allegations.’ 180  The majority in 
Ongwen appears to mark a clear departure from previous confirmation decisions, 
where factual findings were explicitly linked to pieces of evidence through footnotes.  
Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, in his partially dissenting opinion to the 
Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation                                                                                                                                                               
charges, supra note 171, § 24. 
176 Art 61(7) ICCSt. (emphasis added). 
177 Art 61(7)(a) ICCSt. See further, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, 
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-656), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Christine Van den Wyngaert, § 4, stating that ‘must be at least enough of an evidentiary basis to sustain 
a possible conviction on the assumption that these questions are resolved in favour of the Prosecutor at 
trial’; Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 143, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita 
Usacka, § 2 (‘it is the duty of the Chamber to determine whether it is thoroughly satisfied that the 
evidence presented on each element meets the requisite legal standard’.)  
178 Rule 63(2) ICC RPE. Rule 63(1) states that the Rules relating to evidence apply ‘in proceedings 
before all Chambers.’ 
179 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., § 37. 
180 Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Bemba et al. (ICC-01/05-01/13-
749), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 November 2014, § 25.  
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of charges noted that the list of charges in the operative part of a confirmation of 
charges hearing cannot overcome the Chamber’s obligation to provide an account of 
the reasons why those charges were confirmed.181 He noted that any confirmation of 
charges decision ‘in which a Bench drastically curtails discussion of the reasons… 
calls into question whether there is any use in having a statement of reasons in a 
decision on the confirmation of charges; and it amounts to upholding that, in 
decisions on the confirmation of charges, it is no longer necessary to explain why 
there is sufficient evidence to commit a person for trial’.182 In practice, as can be seen 
from the Ongwen confirmation of the charges decision, this approach leads to an 
inconsistency in the level of reasoning provided to support particular charges. We 
might compare, for example, the Confirmation decision’s findings on persecution 
with its findings on forced pregnancy, both charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. As regards persecution, the crime against humanity of denial of a 
fundamental right on discriminatory grounds,183 neither the precise rights denied nor 
the discriminatory basis for their denial are fully elucidated until the operative part of 
decision (i.e. the list of confirmed charges). 184  There, we are told that the 
discriminatory basis was political, as the accused and his alleged co-perpetrators 
perceived the victims to be supporters of the Ugandan government. The evidential 
basis for this finding is not elucidated anywhere in the findings part of the decision – 
we are simply told that the elements of the crime are ‘sufficiently established by the 
evidence’.185 By contrast, for the factual findings on forced pregnancy, the elements 
of the crime are fully elucidated before the evidence of eight witnesses is set out in 
detail in establishing that there were substantial grounds to believe that Dominic 
Ongwen directly committed this crime as well as other sexual and gender based 
crimes – the in-depth analysis of this category of crimes spans 21 of the 46 pages of 
findings in the confirmation decision.  
 That is not, of course, to suggest that no evidence exists on any of the charges; 
it is merely to point out that if it does exist, the Pre-Trial Chamber gave no indication 
of where it could be found. As Judge Perrin de Brichambaut pointed out in his 
separate opinion to the confirmation decision, the Prosecutor had, at the Chamber’s                                                         
181 Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of 
charges, supra note 171, Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, § 14. 
182 Ibid., § 15.  
183 Art 7(1)(h) ICCSt. 
184 Ongwen Confirmation Decision, supra note 154, §§ 81, 84, 88.  
185 e.g. Ongwen Confirmation Decision, supra note 154, § 79. See also, §§ 69, 74, 80, 84. 
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request, provided a ‘pre-confirmation brief’, which set out in detail the evidence that 
linked the accused to the charges across over 250 pages. 186  The Chamber’s 
confirmation decision, by contrast, is much less methodical, with uncertainty as to 
how, if at all, several charges are supported by the evidence presented. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that Judge Perrin de Brichambaut found the majority’s 
treatment of the evidence on certain charges and modes of liability to be somewhat 
uneven.187  
There is little doubt that the Chamber’s insufficiently detailed examination of 
the evidence was heavily influenced by the instructions laid out in the Manual. In its 
response to the defence application for leave to appeal, the Chamber, although it did 
not explicitly refer to the Manual, chided the defence for not fully appreciating what it 
saw as a clear delineation between the ‘reasoning’ part and the ‘charges’ part of the 
decision.188 This delineation, as mentioned above, is the progeny of the Manual alone. 
Some might argue that this division between the charges and the factual findings leads 
to a less focused decision. On the other hand, some supporters of the formulation 
might argue that it prevents confirmation hearings unnecessarily morphing into ‘mini-
trials’ where the evidence is examined to a standard of proof much higher than that 
established in Article 61, and further clarifies exactly which charges in the 
Prosecutor’s Document Containing the Charges have been confirmed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. However, the structural amendments as set out in the Manual cannot give 
judges carte blanche to abandon standards of proof and the thorough evaluation of 
evidence against that standard, as is clearly still required by the Statute.189 
A similar tension on the level of reasoning required for the confirmation of 
charges arose in the Al Mahdi confirmation of charges decision.190 Judge Kovacs, in 
his dissent, criticised the decision for its absence of ‘concrete references to the 
relevant pieces of evidence, which support the Prosecutor’s allegations.’ 191  In a 
similar manner to Judge Perrin de Brichambaut’s separate opinion in Ongwen, Judge 
Kovacs noted that the Chamber was obliged to determine whether the evidence                                                         
186 Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of 
charges, supra note 171, Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, § 9. 
187 Ibid., § 14.  
188 Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of 
charges, supra note 171, §§ 26-27. 
189 Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of 
charges, supra note 171, Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, § 11. 
190 Al Mahdi Confirmation Decision, supra note 153. 
191 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Peter Kovacs, § 4.  
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presented met the standard of proof set out in Article 61(7). In his opinion, the 
majority’s decision had failed to ‘provide a clear and well-reasoned decision, which 
presents a full account of the relevant facts and law in order to reveal transparency of 
the judicial process and guarantee a considerable degree of persuasiveness’.192  
The key issue here is the amount of scrutiny that judges are expected to 
subject the evidential record to in confirmation decisions. It would appear that the 
majority opinion in both decisions felt that the evidential record as a whole supported 
the charges put forward by the prosecution, without feeling the need to rigorously link 
the evidence with the particular element(s) of the relevant charge. This is 
symptomatic of a broader debate between ‘holism’ and ‘atomism’ in international 
criminal fact-finding, which I have discussed at length elsewhere.193 
Some might argue that a holistic overview of the evidence is all that is 
required at the confirmation of the charges stage, where the standard of proof is much 
lower than the trial standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.194 To subject each 
piece of evidence to a level of scrutiny that requires the Court to elaborate on 
precisely which element of the charges that evidence might support, the argument 
might go, would be to raise the standard of proof from ‘substantial grounds to believe’ 
to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. However, as Judge Kovacs pointed out in his dissent in 
Al Mahdi, an earlier stage of proceedings with a lower standard of proof ‘does not 
justify a light assessment of facts or disregarding the proper presentation of evidence 
submitted’, 195 it simply requires that a serious examination be carried out of the 
evidence in the light of the applicable (lower) standard of proof. To subject the 
evidence to a less searching scrutiny would have the effect of rendering the 
confirmation of the charges stage little more than a rubber-stamping exercise, where 
all that is required is for the prosecution to show that some crimes happened in the 
particular situation and that there are reasons to link the accused to some of those 
crimes, with the precise details to be worked out later. This would effectively render 
the confirmation hearing meaningless, and may well lead to inefficiencies later on, 
where the prosecution is still developing its theory of the case as the trial progresses.  
                                                        
192 Ibid., § 6.  
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The majority decisions in Ongwen and Al-Mahdi apparently found some 
support for their approach in the Manual, insofar as it explicitly requires that the 
charges confirmed must not be cross-referenced to the evidence or factual findings. 
This stands to reason, insofar as it is the charges confirmed that are carried forward to 
trial.196 However, the Manual does not, on its face, lower the level of evaluation of 
evidence required, although this may well be how these Chambers have read it. As 
Judge Kovacs noted in his dissent, ‘an assessment even against the backdrop of a 
relatively low evidentiary standard of proof should be carried out thoroughly and the 
decision should demonstrate the thoroughness of the assessment conducted by the 
Chamber.’ 197  The Majority in Al Mahdi, by contrast, believed that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had no role in assessing apparent contradictions in the evidence or in 
adjudging the credibility of witnesses, preferring instead to leave such matters to the 
Trial Chamber. 198  This approach stands in contrast to previous jurisprudence. In 
Mbarushimana, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the Chamber’s role was to consider 
elements of inconsistency, incoherence and ambiguity in the evidence and to treat 
such evidence with caution.199  
Moreover, the legal framework of the Court draws no distinction on the 
standards of evidence depending on the stage of proceedings – Article 69 of the 
Statute on evidence refers to ‘the Court’, not to ‘the Trial Chamber’, while Rule 63(1) 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that ‘The rules of evidence set forth in 
this chapter, together with article 69, shall apply in proceedings before all 
Chambers.’200 The remainder of Rule 63 refers to ‘a Chamber’, which can be taken to 
mean Pre-Trial, Trial, or Appeals Chamber. Pursuant to Rule 63(2), Chambers have 
the authority to assess freely the evidence before them to determine its relevance or 
admissibility. The Pre-Trial Chambers’ refusal to undertake such a free evaluation of 
the evidence in the Al Mahdi and Ongwen appears to abdicate this authority.201  
There is a broader issue here as to the importance attached to the Chambers 
Practice Manual by the Majority in both Ongwen and Al Mahdi. Both dissenting 
                                                        
196 Chambers Practice Manual, supra note 1, 17. 
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judges noted that their colleagues’ reasoning was heavily influenced by the standards 
set out in the Manual.202 It stands to reason that if the purpose of the Manual was to 
streamline ‘best practices’, judges may be unwilling to depart from those established 
practices. However, there is no doctrine of stare decisis before the International 
Criminal Court, so even if the Manual were a reflection of clearly established 
practices before the Court (and that is questionable203), those prior decisions are not 
binding on future Chambers.204 In addition, it must be borne in mind that the Manual 
has no legal status before the Court – being a creation of the judges themselves, it is 
not mentioned in the Statute as a source of law, or referred to in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. Thus, if a conflict arises between the Rules or Statute and 
the Manual, there is no question that the latter must defer to the former. It does seem 
from this early practice that an undue deference has been shown to the Manual, 
without a full evaluation of whether its content is in tension with the Court’s legal 
framework.  
Before turning to an examination of the consequences of showing undue 
deference towards the Manual, it is important to note that the approach of the 
Majority in both Ongwen and Al-Mahdi has not been universal. In Gbagbo, the 
defence appealed against a decision that gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court that the mode of liability may be subject to change,205 
submitting, amongst other arguments, that this decision was in contravention to the 
Manual, which aims to ‘limit the improper use of Regulation 55 immediately after the 
issuance of the confirmation decision even before the opening of the evidentiary 
debate at trial.’206 The Appeals Chamber considered this argument to be ‘misguided’, 
noting that the Manual was not binding, and that a ‘Trial Chamber cannot be 
constrained in its application of Regulation 55 by a recommendation contained in the 
Pre-Trial Practice Manual.’207 While this interpretation has been criticised as leaving 
observers of the Court wondering what the point of having a practice manual is, if not 
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to give some guidance as to how Chambers will act on a particular manner,208 this 
undoubtedly is the correct interpretation of the Manual. 
 
B. Consequences of Undue Deference to the Manual 
It may be argued that the possibility that some judges have treated the Chambers 
Practice Manual with more authority than should attach to a guidance document is of 
little practical concern. Indeed, some may argue that it is a positive development 
insofar as it ensures consistency across differently-constituted Chambers, although 
that argument may be unsupported, given the lack of consistency illustrated by the 
Gbagbo case as discussed above. However, the example set out above – on the level 
of evaluation of evidence required for confirmation decisions – illustrates that this can 
have very real consequences for the fairness of proceedings and, as a result, for the 
legitimacy of the Court. More broadly, this practice raises concerns for legal certainty 
and the determinacy of international criminal law. While the Manual has the potential 
for enormous utility, and to enhance certainty by setting down the consistent 
standards that have been developed in the case law of the Court that should be 
followed in later practice, this is diminished by the fact that it remains open to 
Chambers to disregard those practice directions, whereas Rule or Regulation 
amendments would result in more consistent practice across the Court. Furthermore, 
as illustrated above, resorting to the Manual rather than one of the traditional avenues 
for procedural change (via Rule or Regulation amendments) has the potential to sow 
discord amongst the judges instead of crystallizing consensus. 
From a fair trial perspective, the less detailed treatment of the evidence in 
decisions relating to the confirmation of charges raises several concerns. The 
principle driving the need for a confirmation of charges stage in proceedings was the 
recognition that accused persons should not be put through lengthy international 
criminal proceedings if there was insufficient evidence from the outset to substantially 
support the charges against them. However, when a Chamber does not set out the 
precise reasons why the evidence gives rise to substantial grounds to believe that an 
accused person committed the crimes charged, this raises the potential that cases with 
a weaker evidential basis will proceed to trial only for the accused to be acquitted at                                                         
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the end of a process. This is significant, not least because cases against four suspects 
before the Court failed to proceed past the confirmation stage, owing to a lack of 
evidence. 209  Moreover, the failure to set out a precise evidential basis for the 
confirmation of charges gives rise to a risk that the defendant will not be in a position 
to raise defences or introduce competing evidence to defend themselves against the 
charges, in violation of their rights under Article 67(1)(e) of the Statute. Furthermore, 
it could be argued that a less rigorous treatment of the evidence reflects a breach of 
the presumption of evidence, insofar as the prosecution’s evidence is not subjected to 
the searching scrutiny that would be expected where the accused is genuinely 
presumed innocent.  
Excessive deference to the Manual also gives rise to issues surrounding legal 
certainty, given that the parties will not only have to draft their arguments referencing 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Statute, and established jurisprudence; they will 
also have to refer to an ever-changing catalogue of ‘best practice’ identified by the 
Judges. Given that the Manual can be changed by the Judges of the Court, with no 
legal record of the impetus for such changes and/or the discussions that led to that 
change, the process for procedural change at the ICC is likely to become much more 
opaque that what was envisioned by the drafters of the Statute, who saw the benefit in 
considering proposed amendments in the public forum of the Assembly of States 
Parties. While it may be argued that the identification of best practices gives rise to 
greater legal certainty, the fact that the source of such best practice in the case law is 
often less than clear perhaps detracts from that potential advantage.  
Perhaps as an aside, the minimalist approach to the factual and legal 
assessment of the evidence and charges, as preferred by the Manual and followed by 
the Pre-Trial Chambers in Ongwen and Al-Mahdi, gives rise to a broader question as 
to the role of the function of Confirmation decisions in clarifying the definitions of 
crimes and illustrating the elements of crimes. This was particularly significant for 
those cases where the case did not proceed beyond the confirmation stage – for 
example, the Abu Garda Confirmation decision provides us with the ICC’s definition 
of an ‘attack’ for the purposes of establishing the war crime of attacking peacekeeping 
missions,210 even though no charges were confirmed against the accused,211 while the                                                         
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Katanga and Chui Confirmation decision provides an extensive illustration of what 
might constitute outrages upon personal dignity, 212  even though no charges were 
confirmed on this count.213 It may be argued that it was never the intention of the 
drafters for Confirmation decisions to provide a full elucidation of the elements of the 
crimes,214 but in light of the Court’s less than overwhelming rate of completed cases, 
confirmation decisions have, in the past, borne an important illustrative function that 
they no longer appear to play. To give an example, in Al Mahdi, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber did not enter into a discussion as to the meaning of an ‘attack’ for the 
purposes of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute, but rather noted that the Structures had 
been targeted for their historical and religious character, and that full destruction of 
the targeted cultural property was not required under the Statute.215 Had it entered 
into an assessment of the meaning of the word ‘attack’, the Pre-Trial Chamber would 
doubtless have recalled the Abu Garda Confirmation decision’s definition of ‘attack’ 
as meaning ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence’; 216 this is difficult to square with the interpretation in Al Mahdi that the 
destruction of property by a rebel group in territory occupied by, and under the 
control of, that group constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts.217 
By the same token, the decision by states to destroy a building dedicated to religion, 
education, art, history, science, or medicine that are not military objectives in times of 
armed conflicts, regardless of motive, could now constitute a war crime. 218  An 
absence of detailed reasoning on definitional issues can lead to such anomalies, which 
are not always solved by later Trial judgments.219 
In addition, given that changes to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
are debated in public, via the ASP framework, the use of the Manual to avoid the 
process set out in the ICC’s legal framework, as discussed above, may lead to the 
perception that a shroud of secrecy cloaks the operation of procedural amendments                                                         
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via the Manual. More generally, this may lead to the dilution of the impression that 
procedural rules act as a check on judges’ untrammelled power, given that it is the 
judges themselves who are establishing and amending those procedural 
frameworks.220 
 
Conclusion 
The International Criminal Court’s Chambers Practice Manual, first introduced in 
2015 as a guide to judges of ‘best practices’ to apply before the Court and amended 
every year since, has been hailed as a positive step towards consistency in practice, by 
giving clarity to parties as to best practices developed in the case law which are to be 
followed. It has also been celebrated as a means to ensure that judge-led amendments 
to procedural practices can be implemented without recourse to formal processes that 
can be both unwieldy and excessively politicised. This article provided the first 
rigorous assessment of the effect of the Manual in practice, and it showed that the 
Manual marks a return to procedural law-making by judges in international criminal 
law, despite it being the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute that the power to 
draft and amend procedural rules should lie with states. Despite recent attempts to 
foment, and early success with establishing, a collegiate approach between the Court 
and the Assembly of States Parties in the amendment of procedural rules, the practice 
surrounding formal Rule amendments quickly became politicised and protracted, and 
this has led to an explicit acknowledgement by judges that they will seek to enact 
procedural changes through less formal means. 
 In light of that change in direction, the Chambers Practice Manual is likely to 
grow in significance as the Court moves away from formal amendment of its legal 
framework. However, this article has shown some difficulties in that approach, given 
that aspects of the Manual appear to extend beyond what might be expected from a 
mere guidance document. Furthermore, this article illustrates that some judges, in the 
early practice surrounding the Manual, have perhaps given it more deference than it 
deserves, given that it is neither a primary nor a secondary source of law before the 
Court. This has been illustrated by a recent debate arising on the standard of 
evidentiary assessment to be undertaken for the purposes of confirming the charges                                                         
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under Article 61 of the ICC Statute. This debate highlights the difficulties that can 
arise when the Manual is given a normative force that was not intended for it, as a 
non-binding document. Furthermore, the article illustrates that this recent practice 
gives rise to concerns about consistency, fairness, and legitimacy that ought to be 
addressed as the Manual itself, and practice thereto, continues to grow and develop.   
